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16_security_privacy_ln.asciidoc

@@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ An off-path adversary tries to assess the sender and the receiver of a payment w
 An on-path adversary can leverage any information it might gain by routing the payment of interest.
 
 First, consider the _off-path adversary_.
-In the first step of this attack scenario, a potent off-path adversary deduces the individual balances in each payment channel via probing (described in a subsequent section) and forms a network snapshot at time ++t~1~++. For simplicity's sake, let's make ++t~1~++ equal 12:05.
-It then probes the network again at sometime later at time ++t~2~++, which we'll make 12:10. The attacker would then compare the snapshots at 12:10 and 12:05 and use the differences between the two snapshots to infer information about payments that took place by looking at paths that have changed.
+In the first step of this attack scenario, a potent off-path adversary deduces the individual balances in each payment channel via probing (described in a subsequent section) and forms a network snapshot at time __t~1~__. For simplicity's sake, let's make __t~1~__ equal 12:05.
+It then probes the network again at sometime later at time __t~2~__, which we'll make 12:10. The attacker would then compare the snapshots at 12:10 and 12:05 and use the differences between the two snapshots to infer information about payments that took place by looking at paths that have changed.
 In the simplest case, if only one payment occurred between 12:10 and 12:05, the adversary would observe a single path where the balances have changed by the same amounts.
 Thus, the adversary learns almost everything about this payment: the sender, the recipient, and the amount.
 If multiple payment paths overlap, the adversary needs to apply heuristics to identify such overlap and separate the payments.