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pull/617/head
Jeff Becker 5 years ago
parent 5f823f8ba3
commit 4862dec4be
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GPG Key ID: F357B3B42F6F9B05
2 changed files with 61 additions and 47 deletions
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101
docs/wire-protocol.txt
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@ -30,15 +30,22 @@ A asks for a flow id from B.
B MAY send a flow id to A or MAY reject the message from A.
session handshake:
an encrypted session is established using establish wire session messages
using a newly created flow id.
message format:
outer message format:
there are 2 layers in this protocol, outer messages and inner messages.
outer messages are sent in plaintext and / or obfsucated with symettric
encryption using a preshared key.
inner messages are inside an encrypted and authenticated envelope
wrapped by an outer messages, which is always a data tranmssion message.
outer message format:
every outer message MAY be obfsucated via symettric encryption for dpi
resistance reasons, this is not authenticated encryption.
@ -57,6 +64,11 @@ K = HS(B_k)
N = HS(n + K)
X = SD(K, m, N[0:24])
where
B_k is the long term identity public key of the recipient.
HS is blake2 256 bit non keyed hash
SD is xchacha20 symettric stream cipher (decryption)
outer-header:
<1 byte command>
@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ obtain a flow id
<6 magic bytes "netid?">
<8 bytes netid, I>
<8 bytes timestamp milliseconds since epoch, T>
<32 bytes ed25519 public key of sender, A_k>
<32 bytes public identity key of sender, A_k>
<0-N bytes discarded>
<last 64 bytes signature of unobfuscated packet, Z>
@ -84,8 +96,8 @@ command 'G' - give flow id
<outer-header>
<6 magic bytes "netid!">
<16 bytes new flow id>
<32 bytes ed25519 public key of sender, A_k>
<0-N bytes discarded>
<32 bytes public identiy key of sender, A_k>
<0-N bytes ignored but included in signature>
<last 64 bytes signature of unobfsucated packet, Z>
after recieving a give flow id message a session negotiation can happen with that flow id.
@ -97,8 +109,8 @@ reject new flow
<outer-header>
<14 ascii bytes reason for rejection null padded>
<8 bytes timestamp>
<32 bytes ed25519 public key of sender, A_k>
<0-N bytes discarded>
<32 bytes public identity key of sender, A_k>
<0-N bytes ignored but included in signature>
<last 64 bytes signature of unobsfucated packet, Z>
command 'E' - establish wire session
@ -106,12 +118,17 @@ command 'E' - establish wire session
establish an encrypted session using a flow id
<outer-header>
<2 bytes 0x0a 0x0d>
<4 bytes flags, F>
<16 bytes flow id, B>
<32 bytes ephemeral public encryption key, E>
<8 bytes packet counter starting at 0>
<optional 32 bytes authenticated credentials, A>
<last 64 bytes signature of unobfuscated packet using identity key, Z>
F is currently set to all zeros
every time we try establishing a wire session we increment the counter
by 1 for the next message we send.
@ -145,14 +162,13 @@ Z is keyed hash of entire message
Z is generated via:
msg.Z = '0x00' * 32
msg.Z = MDS(msg, tx_K)
msg.Z = MDS(outer-header + F + N + X, tx_K)
data tranmission:
inner message format of X (after decryption):
header:
inner header:
<1 byte protocol version>
<1 byte command>
@ -162,7 +178,7 @@ command: 'k' (keep alive)
tell other side to acknoledge they are alive
<header>
<inner header>
<2 bytes resevered, set to 0>
<2 bytes attempt counter, set to 0 and incremented every retransmit, reset when we get a keepalive ack>
<2 bytes milliseconds ping timeout>
@ -175,7 +191,7 @@ command: 'l' (keep alive ack)
acknolege keep alive message
<header>
<inner header>
<6 bytes reserved, set to 0>
<8 bytes current session RX limit in bytes per second>
<8 bytes current session TX use in bytes per second>
@ -188,7 +204,7 @@ command: 'n' (advertise neighboors)
tell peer about neighboors, only sent by non service nodes to other non service
nodes.
<header>
<inner header>
<route between us and them>
<0 or more intermediate routes>
<route from a service node>
@ -209,7 +225,7 @@ command: 'c' (congestion)
tell other side to slow down
<header>
<inner header>
<2 bytes reduce TX rate by this many 1024 bytes per second>
<4 bytes milliseconds slowdown lifetime>
<remaining bytes discarded>
@ -218,48 +234,42 @@ command: 'd' (anti-congestion)
tell other side to speed up
<header>
<inner header>
<2 bytes increase TX rate by this many 1024 bytes per second>
<4 bytes milliseconds speedup lifetime>
<remaining bytes discarded>
command: 't' (transmit data)
transmit a message to a peer
command: 's' (start transmission)
initate the transmission of a message to the remote peer
if this fragment is not addressed to us we route it to the neighboor
with the shortest route to the recipiant as advertised by all neighboors.
<inner header>
<1 byte flags F>
<1 byte reserved R set to zero>
<2 bytes total size of full message>
<4 bytes sequence number S>
<32 bytes blake2 hash of full message>
<N remaining bytes first fragment of message>
<header>
<32 bytes public identity key of recipiant>
<32 bytes public identity key of sender>
<24 bytes nounce, N>
<N bytes encrypted message, X>
<last 32 bytes keyed hash, Z>
if F lsb is set then there is no further fragments
encrypted via:
command: 't' (continued transmission)
K = EDDH(recipiant, sender)
X = SE(msg, K, N)
Z = MDS(X, K)
continue transmission of a bigger message
encrypted message format:
<inner header>
<1 byte flags F>
<1 bytes reserved R set to zero>
<2 bytes 16 byte block offset in message>
<4 bytes sequence number S>
<N remaining bytes fragment of message aligned to 16 bytes>
<remaining bytes not aligned to 16 bytes discarded>
<1 byte version, currently 0>
<1 byte number of acks following, aN>
<8 * aN bytes acks>
<4 byte sequence number of fragment or 0 if no fragment is included>
<2 byte 16 byte block offset in message of this fragment if it is included>
<remaining bytes fragment data aligned to 16 bytes>
<discard anything not aligned to 16 bytes>
command: 'q' (acknoledge transmission)
ack format:
acknoledges a transmitted message
<4 byte message sequence number>
<1 byte reserved current set to 0>
<1 byte ack counter (number of acks sent for the corrisponding message)>
<1 byte bitmask fragments selective ack (msb is fragment 0, lsb is fragment 7)>
<1 byte bitmask fragments posative ack (msb is fragment 0, lsb is fragment 7)>
command: 'r' (rotate keys)
@ -273,6 +283,7 @@ n_K = TKE(K, B_e, K_seed, N)
A.tx_K = n_K
B.rx_K = n_K
<inner header>
<2 bytes milliseconds lifetime of old keys, retain them for this long and then discard>
<4 bytes reserved, set to 0>
<32 bytes key exchange nounce, N>
@ -283,7 +294,7 @@ command: 'u' (upgrade)
request protocol upgrade
<header>
<inner header>
<1 byte protocol min version to upgrade to>
<1 byte protocol max version to upgrade to>
<remaining bytes discarded>
@ -292,7 +303,7 @@ command: 'v' (version upgrade)
sent in response to upgrade message
<header>
<inner header>
<1 byte protocol version selected>
<1 byte protocol version highest we support>
<remaining bytes discarded>

7
llarp/net/net.cpp
Unescape Escape View File

@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ namespace llarp
bool
IsBogon(const in6_addr& addr)
{
#ifdef TESTNET
#if defined(TESTNET)
(void)addr;
return false;
#else
@ -1022,12 +1022,15 @@ namespace llarp
iprange_ipv4(192, 168, 0, 0, 16), iprange_ipv4(198, 18, 0, 0, 15),
iprange_ipv4(198, 51, 100, 0, 24), iprange_ipv4(203, 0, 113, 0, 24),
iprange_ipv4(224, 0, 0, 0, 4), iprange_ipv4(240, 0, 0, 0, 4)};
for(const auto& bogon : bogonRanges)
{
if(bogon.Contains(addr))
{
#if defined(TESTNET)
return false;
#else
return true;
#endif
}
}
return false;

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