package acme import ( "context" "crypto" "crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/ed25519" "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/rsa" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/subtle" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "encoding/asn1" "encoding/base64" "encoding/hex" "encoding/json" "errors" "fmt" "io" "net" "net/url" "reflect" "strconv" "strings" "time" "github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2" "github.com/google/go-tpm/legacy/tpm2" "golang.org/x/exp/slices" "github.com/smallstep/go-attestation/attest" "go.step.sm/crypto/jose" "go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil" "go.step.sm/crypto/pemutil" "go.step.sm/crypto/x509util" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner" ) type ChallengeType string const ( // HTTP01 is the http-01 ACME challenge type HTTP01 ChallengeType = "http-01" // DNS01 is the dns-01 ACME challenge type DNS01 ChallengeType = "dns-01" // TLSALPN01 is the tls-alpn-01 ACME challenge type TLSALPN01 ChallengeType = "tls-alpn-01" // DEVICEATTEST01 is the device-attest-01 ACME challenge type DEVICEATTEST01 ChallengeType = "device-attest-01" ) var ( // InsecurePortHTTP01 is the port used to verify http-01 challenges. If not set it // defaults to 80. InsecurePortHTTP01 int // InsecurePortTLSALPN01 is the port used to verify tls-alpn-01 challenges. If not // set it defaults to 443. // // This variable can be used for testing purposes. InsecurePortTLSALPN01 int ) // Challenge represents an ACME response Challenge type. type Challenge struct { ID string `json:"-"` AccountID string `json:"-"` AuthorizationID string `json:"-"` Value string `json:"-"` Type ChallengeType `json:"type"` Status Status `json:"status"` Token string `json:"token"` ValidatedAt string `json:"validated,omitempty"` URL string `json:"url"` Error *Error `json:"error,omitempty"` } // ToLog enables response logging. func (ch *Challenge) ToLog() (interface{}, error) { b, err := json.Marshal(ch) if err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error marshaling challenge for logging") } return string(b), nil } // Validate attempts to validate the Challenge. Stores changes to the Challenge // type using the DB interface. If the Challenge is validated, the 'status' and // 'validated' attributes are updated. func (ch *Challenge) Validate(ctx context.Context, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, payload []byte) error { // If already valid or invalid then return without performing validation. if ch.Status != StatusPending { return nil } switch ch.Type { case HTTP01: return http01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk) case DNS01: return dns01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk) case TLSALPN01: return tlsalpn01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk) case DEVICEATTEST01: return deviceAttest01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk, payload) default: return NewErrorISE("unexpected challenge type '%s'", ch.Type) } } func http01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) error { u := &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: http01ChallengeHost(ch.Value), Path: fmt.Sprintf("/.well-known/acme-challenge/%s", ch.Token)} // Append insecure port if set. // Only used for testing purposes. if InsecurePortHTTP01 != 0 { u.Host += ":" + strconv.Itoa(InsecurePortHTTP01) } vc := MustClientFromContext(ctx) resp, err := vc.Get(u.String()) if err != nil { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, WrapError(ErrorConnectionType, err, "error doing http GET for url %s", u)) } defer resp.Body.Close() if resp.StatusCode >= 400 { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, NewError(ErrorConnectionType, "error doing http GET for url %s with status code %d", u, resp.StatusCode)) } body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) if err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error reading "+ "response body for url %s", u) } keyAuth := strings.TrimSpace(string(body)) expected, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk) if err != nil { return err } if keyAuth != expected { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "keyAuthorization does not match; expected %s, but got %s", expected, keyAuth)) } // Update and store the challenge. ch.Status = StatusValid ch.Error = nil ch.ValidatedAt = clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339) if err = db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating challenge") } return nil } // http01ChallengeHost checks if a Challenge value is an IPv6 address // and adds square brackets if that's the case, so that it can be used // as a hostname. Returns the original Challenge value as the host to // use in other cases. func http01ChallengeHost(value string) string { if ip := net.ParseIP(value); ip != nil && ip.To4() == nil { value = "[" + value + "]" } return value } func tlsAlert(err error) uint8 { var opErr *net.OpError if errors.As(err, &opErr) { v := reflect.ValueOf(opErr.Err) if v.Kind() == reflect.Uint8 { return uint8(v.Uint()) } } return 0 } func tlsalpn01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) error { config := &tls.Config{ NextProtos: []string{"acme-tls/1"}, // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8737#section-4 // ACME servers that implement "acme-tls/1" MUST only negotiate TLS 1.2 // [RFC5246] or higher when connecting to clients for validation. MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, ServerName: serverName(ch), InsecureSkipVerify: true, //nolint:gosec // we expect a self-signed challenge certificate } var hostPort string // Allow to change TLS port for testing purposes. if port := InsecurePortTLSALPN01; port == 0 { hostPort = net.JoinHostPort(ch.Value, "443") } else { hostPort = net.JoinHostPort(ch.Value, strconv.Itoa(port)) } vc := MustClientFromContext(ctx) conn, err := vc.TLSDial("tcp", hostPort, config) if err != nil { // With Go 1.17+ tls.Dial fails if there's no overlap between configured // client and server protocols. When this happens the connection is // closed with the error no_application_protocol(120) as required by // RFC7301. See https://golang.org/doc/go1.17#ALPN if tlsAlert(err) == 120 { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "cannot negotiate ALPN acme-tls/1 protocol for tls-alpn-01 challenge")) } return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, WrapError(ErrorConnectionType, err, "error doing TLS dial for %s", hostPort)) } defer conn.Close() cs := conn.ConnectionState() certs := cs.PeerCertificates if len(certs) == 0 { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "%s challenge for %s resulted in no certificates", ch.Type, ch.Value)) } if cs.NegotiatedProtocol != "acme-tls/1" { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "cannot negotiate ALPN acme-tls/1 protocol for tls-alpn-01 challenge")) } leafCert := certs[0] // if no DNS names present, look for IP address and verify that exactly one exists if len(leafCert.DNSNames) == 0 { if len(leafCert.IPAddresses) != 1 || !leafCert.IPAddresses[0].Equal(net.ParseIP(ch.Value)) { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: leaf certificate must contain a single IP address or DNS name, %v", ch.Value)) } } else { if len(leafCert.DNSNames) != 1 || !strings.EqualFold(leafCert.DNSNames[0], ch.Value) { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: leaf certificate must contain a single IP address or DNS name, %v", ch.Value)) } } idPeAcmeIdentifier := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 31} idPeAcmeIdentifierV1Obsolete := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 30, 1} foundIDPeAcmeIdentifierV1Obsolete := false keyAuth, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk) if err != nil { return err } hashedKeyAuth := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuth)) for _, ext := range leafCert.Extensions { if idPeAcmeIdentifier.Equal(ext.Id) { if !ext.Critical { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: acmeValidationV1 extension not critical")) } var extValue []byte rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &extValue) if err != nil || len(rest) > 0 || len(hashedKeyAuth) != len(extValue) { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: malformed acmeValidationV1 extension value")) } if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hashedKeyAuth[:], extValue) != 1 { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: "+ "expected acmeValidationV1 extension value %s for this challenge but got %s", hex.EncodeToString(hashedKeyAuth[:]), hex.EncodeToString(extValue))) } ch.Status = StatusValid ch.Error = nil ch.ValidatedAt = clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339) if err = db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "tlsalpn01ValidateChallenge - error updating challenge") } return nil } if idPeAcmeIdentifierV1Obsolete.Equal(ext.Id) { foundIDPeAcmeIdentifierV1Obsolete = true } } if foundIDPeAcmeIdentifierV1Obsolete { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: obsolete id-pe-acmeIdentifier in acmeValidationV1 extension")) } return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "incorrect certificate for tls-alpn-01 challenge: missing acmeValidationV1 extension")) } func dns01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) error { // Normalize domain for wildcard DNS names // This is done to avoid making TXT lookups for domains like // _acme-challenge.*.example.com // Instead perform txt lookup for _acme-challenge.example.com domain := strings.TrimPrefix(ch.Value, "*.") vc := MustClientFromContext(ctx) txtRecords, err := vc.LookupTxt("_acme-challenge." + domain) if err != nil { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, WrapError(ErrorDNSType, err, "error looking up TXT records for domain %s", domain)) } expectedKeyAuth, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk) if err != nil { return err } h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(expectedKeyAuth)) expected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:]) var found bool for _, r := range txtRecords { if r == expected { found = true break } } if !found { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "keyAuthorization does not match; expected %s, but got %s", expectedKeyAuth, txtRecords)) } // Update and store the challenge. ch.Status = StatusValid ch.Error = nil ch.ValidatedAt = clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339) if err = db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating challenge") } return nil } type payloadType struct { AttObj string `json:"attObj"` Error string `json:"error"` } type attestationObject struct { Format string `json:"fmt"` AttStatement map[string]interface{} `json:"attStmt,omitempty"` } // TODO(bweeks): move attestation verification to a shared package. func deviceAttest01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, payload []byte) error { // Load authorization to store the key fingerprint. az, err := db.GetAuthorization(ctx, ch.AuthorizationID) if err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error loading authorization") } // Parse payload. var p payloadType if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &p); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error unmarshalling JSON") } if p.Error != "" { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "payload contained error: %v", p.Error)) } attObj, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(p.AttObj) if err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error base64 decoding attObj") } att := attestationObject{} if err := cbor.Unmarshal(attObj, &att); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error unmarshalling CBOR") } format := att.Format prov := MustProvisionerFromContext(ctx) if !prov.IsAttestationFormatEnabled(ctx, provisioner.ACMEAttestationFormat(format)) { if format != "apple" && format != "step" && format != "tpm" { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "unsupported attestation object format %q", format)) } return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "attestation format %q is not enabled", format)) } switch format { case "apple": data, err := doAppleAttestationFormat(ctx, prov, ch, &att) if err != nil { var acmeError *Error if errors.As(err, &acmeError) { if acmeError.Status == 500 { return acmeError } return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, acmeError) } return WrapErrorISE(err, "error validating attestation") } // Validate nonce with SHA-256 of the token. if len(data.Nonce) != 0 { sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ch.Token)) if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(data.Nonce, sum[:]) != 1 { return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "challenge token does not match")) } } // Validate Apple's ClientIdentifier (Identifier.Value) with device // identifiers. // // Note: We might want to use an external service for this. if data.UDID != ch.Value && data.SerialNumber != ch.Value { subproblem := NewSubproblemWithIdentifier( ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, Identifier{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: ch.Value}, "challenge identifier %q doesn't match any of the attested hardware identifiers %q", ch.Value, []string{data.UDID, data.SerialNumber}, ) return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "permanent identifier does not match").AddSubproblems(subproblem)) } // Update attestation key fingerprint to compare against the CSR az.Fingerprint = data.Fingerprint case "step": data, err := doStepAttestationFormat(ctx, prov, ch, jwk, &att) if err != nil { var acmeError *Error if errors.As(err, &acmeError) { if acmeError.Status == 500 { return acmeError } return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, acmeError) } return WrapErrorISE(err, "error validating attestation") } // Validate the YubiKey serial number from the attestation // certificate with the challenged Order value. // // Note: We might want to use an external service for this. if data.SerialNumber != ch.Value { subproblem := NewSubproblemWithIdentifier( ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, Identifier{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: ch.Value}, "challenge identifier %q doesn't match the attested hardware identifier %q", ch.Value, data.SerialNumber, ) return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "permanent identifier does not match").AddSubproblems(subproblem)) } // Update attestation key fingerprint to compare against the CSR az.Fingerprint = data.Fingerprint case "tpm": data, err := doTPMAttestationFormat(ctx, prov, ch, jwk, &att) if err != nil { var acmeError *Error if errors.As(err, &acmeError) { if acmeError.Status == 500 { return acmeError } return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, acmeError) } return WrapErrorISE(err, "error validating attestation") } // TODO(hs): currently this will allow a request for which no PermanentIdentifiers have been // extracted from the AK certificate. This is currently the case for AK certs from the CLI, as we // haven't implemented a way for AK certs requested by the CLI to always contain the requested // PermanentIdentifier. Omitting the check below doesn't allow just any request, as the Order can // still fail if the challenge value isn't equal to the CSR subject. if len(data.PermanentIdentifiers) > 0 && !slices.Contains(data.PermanentIdentifiers, ch.Value) { // TODO(hs): add support for HardwareModuleName subproblem := NewSubproblemWithIdentifier( ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, Identifier{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: ch.Value}, "challenge identifier %q doesn't match any of the attested hardware identifiers %q", ch.Value, data.PermanentIdentifiers, ) return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "permanent identifier does not match").AddSubproblems(subproblem)) } // Update attestation key fingerprint to compare against the CSR az.Fingerprint = data.Fingerprint default: return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "unsupported attestation object format %q", format)) } // Update and store the challenge. ch.Status = StatusValid ch.Error = nil ch.ValidatedAt = clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339) // Store the fingerprint in the authorization. // // TODO: add method to update authorization and challenge atomically. if az.Fingerprint != "" { if err := db.UpdateAuthorization(ctx, az); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating authorization") } } if err := db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating challenge") } return nil } var ( oidSubjectAlternativeName = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 17} ) type tpmAttestationData struct { Certificate *x509.Certificate VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate PermanentIdentifiers []string Fingerprint string } // coseAlgorithmIdentifier models a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier. // Also see https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-alg-identifier. type coseAlgorithmIdentifier int32 const ( coseAlgES256 coseAlgorithmIdentifier = -7 coseAlgRS256 coseAlgorithmIdentifier = -257 ) func doTPMAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, att *attestationObject) (*tpmAttestationData, error) { ver, ok := att.AttStatement["ver"].(string) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "ver not present") } if ver != "2.0" { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "version %q is not supported", ver) } x5c, ok := att.AttStatement["x5c"].([]interface{}) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c not present") } if len(x5c) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is empty") } akCertBytes, ok := x5c[0].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed") } akCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(akCertBytes) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed") } intermediates := x509.NewCertPool() for _, v := range x5c[1:] { intCertBytes, vok := v.([]byte) if !vok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed") } intCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(intCertBytes) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed") } intermediates.AddCert(intCert) } // TODO(hs): this can be removed when permanent-identifier/hardware-module-name are handled correctly in // the stdlib in https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.19:src/crypto/x509/parser.go;drc=b5b2cf519fe332891c165077f3723ee74932a647;l=362, // but I doubt that will happen. if len(akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions) > 0 { unhandledCriticalExtensions := akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions[:0] for _, extOID := range akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions { if !extOID.Equal(oidSubjectAlternativeName) { // critical extensions other than the Subject Alternative Name remain unhandled unhandledCriticalExtensions = append(unhandledCriticalExtensions, extOID) } } akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = unhandledCriticalExtensions } roots, ok := prov.GetAttestationRoots() if !ok { return nil, NewErrorISE("no root CA bundle available to verify the attestation certificate") } // verify that the AK certificate was signed by a trusted root, // chained to by the intermediates provided by the client. As part // of building the verified certificate chain, the signature over the // AK certificate is checked to be a valid signature of one of the // provided intermediates. Signatures over the intermediates are in // turn also verified to be valid signatures from one of the trusted // roots. verifiedChains, err := akCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{ Roots: roots, Intermediates: intermediates, CurrentTime: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second), KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny}, }) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is not valid") } // validate additional AK certificate requirements if err := validateAKCertificate(akCert); err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "AK certificate is not valid") } // TODO(hs): implement revocation check; Verify() doesn't perform CRL check nor OCSP lookup. sans, err := x509util.ParseSubjectAlternativeNames(akCert) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed parsing AK certificate Subject Alternative Names") } permanentIdentifiers := make([]string, len(sans.PermanentIdentifiers)) for i, pi := range sans.PermanentIdentifiers { permanentIdentifiers[i] = pi.Identifier } // extract and validate pubArea, sig, certInfo and alg properties from the request body pubArea, ok := att.AttStatement["pubArea"].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid pubArea in attestation statement") } if len(pubArea) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "pubArea is empty") } sig, ok := att.AttStatement["sig"].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid sig in attestation statement") } if len(sig) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "sig is empty") } certInfo, ok := att.AttStatement["certInfo"].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid certInfo in attestation statement") } if len(certInfo) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "certInfo is empty") } alg, ok := att.AttStatement["alg"].(int64) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid alg in attestation statement") } // only RS256 and ES256 are allowed coseAlg := coseAlgorithmIdentifier(alg) if coseAlg != coseAlgRS256 && coseAlg != coseAlgES256 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid alg %d in attestation statement", alg) } // set the hash algorithm to use to SHA256 hash := crypto.SHA256 // recreate the generated key certification parameter values and verify // the attested key using the public key of the AK. certificationParameters := &attest.CertificationParameters{ Public: pubArea, // the public key that was attested CreateAttestation: certInfo, // the attested properties of the key CreateSignature: sig, // signature over the attested properties } verifyOpts := attest.VerifyOpts{ Public: akCert.PublicKey, // public key of the AK that attested the key Hash: hash, } if err = certificationParameters.Verify(verifyOpts); err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "invalid certification parameters") } // decode the "certInfo" data. This won't fail, as it's also done as part of Verify(). tpmCertInfo, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(certInfo) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed decoding attestation data") } keyAuth, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk) if err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "failed creating key auth digest") } hashedKeyAuth := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuth)) // verify the WebAuthn object contains the expect key authorization digest, which is carried // within the encoded `certInfo` property of the attestation statement. if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hashedKeyAuth[:], []byte(tpmCertInfo.ExtraData)) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "key authorization invalid") } // decode the (attested) public key and determine its fingerprint. This won't fail, as it's also done as part of Verify(). pub, err := tpm2.DecodePublic(pubArea) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed decoding pubArea") } publicKey, err := pub.Key() if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed getting public key") } data := &tpmAttestationData{ Certificate: akCert, VerifiedChains: verifiedChains, PermanentIdentifiers: permanentIdentifiers, } if data.Fingerprint, err = keyutil.Fingerprint(publicKey); err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint") } // TODO(hs): pass more attestation data, so that that can be used/recorded too? return data, nil } var ( oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37} oidTCGKpAIKCertificate = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 23, 133, 8, 3} ) // validateAKCertifiate validates the X.509 AK certificate to be // in accordance with the required properties. The requirements come from: // https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-tpm-cert-requirements. // // - Version MUST be set to 3. // - Subject field MUST be set to empty. // - The Subject Alternative Name extension MUST be set as defined // in [TPMv2-EK-Profile] section 3.2.9. // - The Extended Key Usage extension MUST contain the OID 2.23.133.8.3 // ("joint-iso-itu-t(2) internationalorganizations(23) 133 tcg-kp(8) tcg-kp-AIKCertificate(3)"). // - The Basic Constraints extension MUST have the CA component set to false. // - An Authority Information Access (AIA) extension with entry id-ad-ocsp // and a CRL Distribution Point extension [RFC5280] are both OPTIONAL as // the status of many attestation certificates is available through metadata // services. See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service. func validateAKCertificate(c *x509.Certificate) error { if c.Version != 3 { return fmt.Errorf("AK certificate has invalid version %d; only version 3 is allowed", c.Version) } if c.Subject.String() != "" { return fmt.Errorf("AK certificate subject must be empty; got %q", c.Subject) } if c.IsCA { return errors.New("AK certificate must not be a CA") } if err := validateAKCertificateExtendedKeyUsage(c); err != nil { return err } return validateAKCertificateSubjectAlternativeNames(c) } // validateAKCertificateSubjectAlternativeNames checks if the AK certificate // has TPM hardware details set. func validateAKCertificateSubjectAlternativeNames(c *x509.Certificate) error { sans, err := x509util.ParseSubjectAlternativeNames(c) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed parsing AK certificate Subject Alternative Names: %w", err) } details := sans.TPMHardwareDetails manufacturer, model, version := details.Manufacturer, details.Model, details.Version switch { case manufacturer == "": return errors.New("missing TPM manufacturer") case model == "": return errors.New("missing TPM model") case version == "": return errors.New("missing TPM version") } return nil } // validateAKCertificateExtendedKeyUsage checks if the AK certificate // has the "tcg-kp-AIKCertificate" Extended Key Usage set. func validateAKCertificateExtendedKeyUsage(c *x509.Certificate) error { var ( valid = false ekus []asn1.ObjectIdentifier ) for _, ext := range c.Extensions { if ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage) { if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &ekus); err != nil || !ekus[0].Equal(oidTCGKpAIKCertificate) { return errors.New("AK certificate is missing Extended Key Usage value tcg-kp-AIKCertificate (2.23.133.8.3)") } valid = true } } if !valid { return errors.New("AK certificate is missing Extended Key Usage extension") } return nil } // Apple Enterprise Attestation Root CA from // https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/private/ const appleEnterpriseAttestationRootCA = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICJDCCAamgAwIBAgIUQsDCuyxyfFxeq/bxpm8frF15hzcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMw UTEtMCsGA1UEAwwkQXBwbGUgRW50ZXJwcmlzZSBBdHRlc3RhdGlvbiBSb290IENB MRMwEQYDVQQKDApBcHBsZSBJbmMuMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzAeFw0yMjAyMTYxOTAx MjRaFw00NzAyMjAwMDAwMDBaMFExLTArBgNVBAMMJEFwcGxlIEVudGVycHJpc2Ug QXR0ZXN0YXRpb24gUm9vdCBDQTETMBEGA1UECgwKQXBwbGUgSW5jLjELMAkGA1UE BhMCVVMwdjAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAIgNiAAT6Jigq+Ps9Q4CoT8t8q+UnOe2p oT9nRaUfGhBTbgvqSGXPjVkbYlIWYO+1zPk2Sz9hQ5ozzmLrPmTBgEWRcHjA2/y7 7GEicps9wn2tj+G89l3INNDKETdxSPPIZpPj8VmjQjBAMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMB Af8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFPNqTQGd8muBpV5du+UIbVbi+d66MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIB BjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAwNpADBmAjEA1xpWmTLSpr1VH4f8Ypk8f3jMUKYz4QPG8mL5 8m9sX/b2+eXpTv2pH4RZgJjucnbcAjEA4ZSB6S45FlPuS/u4pTnzoz632rA+xW/T ZwFEh9bhKjJ+5VQ9/Do1os0u3LEkgN/r -----END CERTIFICATE-----` var ( oidAppleSerialNumber = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113635, 100, 8, 9, 1} oidAppleUniqueDeviceIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113635, 100, 8, 9, 2} oidAppleSecureEnclaveProcessorOSVersion = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113635, 100, 8, 10, 2} oidAppleNonce = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113635, 100, 8, 11, 1} ) type appleAttestationData struct { Nonce []byte SerialNumber string UDID string SEPVersion string Certificate *x509.Certificate Fingerprint string } func doAppleAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, _ *Challenge, att *attestationObject) (*appleAttestationData, error) { // Use configured or default attestation roots if none is configured. roots, ok := prov.GetAttestationRoots() if !ok { root, err := pemutil.ParseCertificate([]byte(appleEnterpriseAttestationRootCA)) if err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error parsing apple enterprise ca") } roots = x509.NewCertPool() roots.AddCert(root) } x5c, ok := att.AttStatement["x5c"].([]interface{}) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c not present") } if len(x5c) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is empty") } der, ok := x5c[0].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed") } leaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed") } intermediates := x509.NewCertPool() for _, v := range x5c[1:] { der, ok = v.([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed") } cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed") } intermediates.AddCert(cert) } if _, err := leaf.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{ Intermediates: intermediates, Roots: roots, CurrentTime: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second), KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny}, }); err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is not valid") } data := &appleAttestationData{ Certificate: leaf, } if data.Fingerprint, err = keyutil.Fingerprint(leaf.PublicKey); err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint") } for _, ext := range leaf.Extensions { switch { case ext.Id.Equal(oidAppleSerialNumber): data.SerialNumber = string(ext.Value) case ext.Id.Equal(oidAppleUniqueDeviceIdentifier): data.UDID = string(ext.Value) case ext.Id.Equal(oidAppleSecureEnclaveProcessorOSVersion): data.SEPVersion = string(ext.Value) case ext.Id.Equal(oidAppleNonce): data.Nonce = ext.Value } } return data, nil } // Yubico PIV Root CA Serial 263751 // https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Introduction/piv-attestation-ca.pem const yubicoPIVRootCA = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIDBAZHMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCsxKTAnBgNVBAMMIFl1 YmljbyBQSVYgUm9vdCBDQSBTZXJpYWwgMjYzNzUxMCAXDTE2MDMxNDAwMDAwMFoY DzIwNTIwNDE3MDAwMDAwWjArMSkwJwYDVQQDDCBZdWJpY28gUElWIFJvb3QgQ0Eg U2VyaWFsIDI2Mzc1MTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMN2 cMTNR6YCdcTFRxuPy31PabRn5m6pJ+nSE0HRWpoaM8fc8wHC+Tmb98jmNvhWNE2E ilU85uYKfEFP9d6Q2GmytqBnxZsAa3KqZiCCx2LwQ4iYEOb1llgotVr/whEpdVOq joU0P5e1j1y7OfwOvky/+AXIN/9Xp0VFlYRk2tQ9GcdYKDmqU+db9iKwpAzid4oH BVLIhmD3pvkWaRA2H3DA9t7H/HNq5v3OiO1jyLZeKqZoMbPObrxqDg+9fOdShzgf wCqgT3XVmTeiwvBSTctyi9mHQfYd2DwkaqxRnLbNVyK9zl+DzjSGp9IhVPiVtGet X02dxhQnGS7K6BO0Qe8CAwEAAaNCMEAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMpfyvLEojGc6SJf8ez0 1d8Cv4O/MA8GA1UdEwQIMAYBAf8CAQEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBc7Ih8Bc1fkC+FyN1fhjWioBCMr3vjneh7MLbA6kSoyWF70N3s XhbXvT4eRh0hvxqvMZNjPU/VlRn6gLVtoEikDLrYFXN6Hh6Wmyy1GTnspnOvMvz2 lLKuym9KYdYLDgnj3BeAvzIhVzzYSeU77/Cupofj093OuAswW0jYvXsGTyix6B3d bW5yWvyS9zNXaqGaUmP3U9/b6DlHdDogMLu3VLpBB9bm5bjaKWWJYgWltCVgUbFq Fqyi4+JE014cSgR57Jcu3dZiehB6UtAPgad9L5cNvua/IWRmm+ANy3O2LH++Pyl8 SREzU8onbBsjMg9QDiSf5oJLKvd/Ren+zGY7 -----END CERTIFICATE-----` // Serial number of the YubiKey, encoded as an integer. // https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Introduction/PIV_attestation.html var oidYubicoSerialNumber = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 41482, 3, 7} type stepAttestationData struct { Certificate *x509.Certificate SerialNumber string Fingerprint string } func doStepAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, att *attestationObject) (*stepAttestationData, error) { // Use configured or default attestation roots if none is configured. roots, ok := prov.GetAttestationRoots() if !ok { root, err := pemutil.ParseCertificate([]byte(yubicoPIVRootCA)) if err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error parsing root ca") } roots = x509.NewCertPool() roots.AddCert(root) } // Extract x5c and verify certificate x5c, ok := att.AttStatement["x5c"].([]interface{}) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c not present") } if len(x5c) == 0 { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "x5c is empty") } der, ok := x5c[0].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed") } leaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed") } intermediates := x509.NewCertPool() for _, v := range x5c[1:] { der, ok = v.([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed") } cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der) if err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed") } intermediates.AddCert(cert) } if _, err := leaf.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{ Intermediates: intermediates, Roots: roots, CurrentTime: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second), KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny}, }); err != nil { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is not valid") } // Verify proof of possession of private key validating the key // authorization. Per recommendation at // https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-signature-attestation-types the // signature is CBOR-encoded. var sig []byte csig, ok := att.AttStatement["sig"].([]byte) if !ok { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "sig not present") } if err := cbor.Unmarshal(csig, &sig); err != nil { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "sig is malformed") } keyAuth, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk) if err != nil { return nil, err } switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) { case *ecdsa.PublicKey: if pub.Curve != elliptic.P256() { return nil, WrapDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "unsupported elliptic curve %s", pub.Curve) } sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuth)) if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pub, sum[:], sig) { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "failed to validate signature") } case *rsa.PublicKey: sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuth)) if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, crypto.SHA256, sum[:], sig); err != nil { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "failed to validate signature") } case ed25519.PublicKey: if !ed25519.Verify(pub, []byte(keyAuth), sig) { return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "failed to validate signature") } default: return nil, NewDetailedError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "unsupported public key type %T", pub) } // Parse attestation data: // TODO(mariano): add support for other extensions. data := &stepAttestationData{ Certificate: leaf, } if data.Fingerprint, err = keyutil.Fingerprint(leaf.PublicKey); err != nil { return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint") } for _, ext := range leaf.Extensions { if !ext.Id.Equal(oidYubicoSerialNumber) { continue } var serialNumber int rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &serialNumber) if err != nil || len(rest) > 0 { return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "error parsing serial number") } data.SerialNumber = strconv.Itoa(serialNumber) break } return data, nil } // serverName determines the SNI HostName to set based on an acme.Challenge // for TLS-ALPN-01 challenges RFC8738 states that, if HostName is an IP, it // should be the ARPA address https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8738#section-6. // It also references TLS Extensions [RFC6066]. func serverName(ch *Challenge) string { var serverName string ip := net.ParseIP(ch.Value) if ip != nil { serverName = reverseAddr(ip) } else { serverName = ch.Value } return serverName } // reverseaddr returns the in-addr.arpa. or ip6.arpa. hostname of the IP // address addr suitable for rDNS (PTR) record lookup or an error if it fails // to parse the IP address. // Implementation taken and adapted from https://golang.org/src/net/dnsclient.go?s=780:834#L20 func reverseAddr(ip net.IP) (arpa string) { if ip.To4() != nil { return uitoa(uint(ip[15])) + "." + uitoa(uint(ip[14])) + "." + uitoa(uint(ip[13])) + "." + uitoa(uint(ip[12])) + ".in-addr.arpa." } // Must be IPv6 buf := make([]byte, 0, len(ip)*4+len("ip6.arpa.")) // Add it, in reverse, to the buffer for i := len(ip) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { v := ip[i] buf = append(buf, hexit[v&0xF], '.', hexit[v>>4], '.') } // Append "ip6.arpa." and return (buf already has the final .) buf = append(buf, "ip6.arpa."...) return string(buf) } // Convert unsigned integer to decimal string. // Implementation taken from https://golang.org/src/net/parse.go func uitoa(val uint) string { if val == 0 { // avoid string allocation return "0" } var buf [20]byte // big enough for 64bit value base 10 i := len(buf) - 1 for val >= 10 { v := val / 10 buf[i] = byte('0' + val - v*10) i-- val = v } // val < 10 buf[i] = byte('0' + val) return string(buf[i:]) } const hexit = "0123456789abcdef" // KeyAuthorization creates the ACME key authorization value from a token // and a jwk. func KeyAuthorization(token string, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) (string, error) { thumbprint, err := jwk.Thumbprint(crypto.SHA256) if err != nil { return "", WrapErrorISE(err, "error generating JWK thumbprint") } encPrint := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(thumbprint) return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", token, encPrint), nil } // storeError the given error to an ACME error and saves using the DB interface. func storeError(ctx context.Context, db DB, ch *Challenge, markInvalid bool, err *Error) error { ch.Error = err if markInvalid { ch.Status = StatusInvalid } if err := db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil { return WrapErrorISE(err, "failure saving error to acme challenge") } return nil }